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ABSTRACT
The academic character of the article is connected with the attempt to answer the question asked 
in the title: Utopia without the law – is it possible? The theoretical arguments provided by the author 
lead to an affirmative answer to this question and allow for formulating the following thesis: there 
is no utopia without the law. The law is not only present in utopias, both positive and negative ones 
(anti-utopias and dystopias) but also, to a great extent, determines their existence and functioning. 
As a result, it links utopian thinking to reality. Any answer to this question is possible and justifiable 
in the academic discourse. According to the author of this article not only the law is present in the 
utopia but the law in the utopia must exist. The essence of the law in utopias is justice, but there is 
not justice in utopias without wisdom. The Bible, Roman law and philosophical and legal reflection 
were the sources of an approach to law for the creators of utopia. Referring to the views of such 
thinkers as: Plato, Immanuel Kant, Rudolf von Ihering, Gustav Radbruch, Karl R. Popper, Bronisław 
Baczko, the author states that the law is an integral part of both worlds: the utopian world and real 
world. So, there is not utopia without the law as an idea of jusctice, implemented into the social life 
of the people who are intelligent beings.
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Etiam latrones suis legibus parent /
Even robbers have their own laws.
(Cicero)
INTRODUCTION
The title question is very simple. Yet, the answer to this question does not have 
to be equally simple. Quite to the contrary, especially in the academic discourse, 
any answer to this question is possible and justifiable but always requires a proper 
substantiation. While preparing my answer I decided to focus on three issues re-
lated to the axiology of law and, in particular, legal absolutism and nihilism. The 
first one regards the instrumentalisation of the law in utopias and the close and 
inextricable links between law and politics. The second issue refers to the notion of 
lawlessness, which always stems from the instrumental use of law and, eventually, 
from injustice. The third one is an answer to a question regarding philosophy and 
law, i.e.: What should the law be and what can we read about that in utopias? If we 
answer “no” to the question asked in the title, we must realize that in utopias, the 
law as such is understood very broadly. Thus, there is no utopia without any law 
at all, i.e. the law understood, first of all, as principles, rules and norms that apply 
to people who are social and intelligent beings. The definition of utopia provided 
by Witold Parniewski puts an emphasis on the fact that it is
a world based on rules but those rules are, however, totally different from the ones that exist in 
the real world. It is a reality that is alternative to what is real, imperfect and empirically verifiable. 
Utopia is also an expression of an act of thinking that comes from a longing for perfection, structure, 
order, happy places and happy times.1
The author believes that utopia comes in different forms and shapes:
[…] it can be contained in social treaties, moral systems, theories of upbringing, projects (con-
stitution, state, law) aimed at improving the forms of social interactions, transforming humanity; in 
scientific and philosophical works, in ideas, religions, myths, legends and fairy tales, in literature 
and in art.2
In such a context, we can develop the negative answer further by saying that 
there is no utopia without the law understood as a certain catalogue of clearly 
defined orders and prohibitions or civil rights and obligations. The law in utopias 
can also be described as a catalogue of natural, universal, eternal and inalienable 
rights of each individual human being, which are identified today as human rights. 
Finally, there is no utopia without the law understood as a carrier of higher val-
1 W. Parniewski, Szkice z dziejów myśli utopijnej (Od Platona do Zinowjewa), Łódź 2000, p. 11.
2 Ibidem.
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ues, either republican, democratic, liberal, egalitarian, socialist or communist but, 
most of all, the values that are referred to as ideals, i.e. justice, fairness, goodness, 
beauty, truth, peace, etc.
What is more, since their creation, social utopias have clearly contributed to 
establishing new branches of law or developing and reforming the existent ones. 
Most of all, we can see in them a harmonious co-existence of the law that applies 
to community (public) interest and the law that applies to individual (private) 
interest. However, the focus is on the regulations connected with criminal law 
and civil law, which leads to specializations within those disciplines which we 
now have in the contemporary law, such as penitentiary law, police law, marital 
law, property law, inheritance law, labour law and a number of social laws. The 
important thing here is that the law in utopias becomes a collection of innovative 
ideas used by the real legal system, e.g. they can be referred to in the legislative 
process as de lege ferenda suggestions. It is because the law in utopias is a carrier 
of new legal institutions and solutions that could be implemented in the real life 
and used in practice. In such a way, the law in utopias constitutes an important 
element that gives an actual meaning to the ideological message of a utopia itself. 
Thus, there is no way that a utopia can be realized without the law, which should 
be recognized as a sine qua non to realizing a utopia. A perfect law becomes a sine 
qua non for the existence, creation or organization of a perfect world. Law is not 
only an element which brings those two worlds (utopia and reality) together like 
a bridge but, most of all, law transcends those two worlds and exists in both of 
them, influences and shapes them.
Within this framework, what appears to be one of the main messages of so-
cial utopias is that we can live in a better world and we should try to improve it. 
Therefore, just like the law, also the world can be, in fact, shaped in any given way. 
However, the problem is that it is much easier to change the world by changing 
the law than change, or rather create the so-called “new human being”. Utopias 
usually give simple recipes assuming that the first step to make this world a better 
place is to introduce a new legal order or change the current one. It means that we 
have more faith in the possibilities offered by the law than we have faith in people. 
While it is very easy to change the law, it is more difficult to improve the world 
and the most difficult task is to make people better. Most utopians had no doubt 
while creating their imaginary worlds that it is the law that has the biggest power 
of making an impact on people, who are intelligent beings willing to organize their 
relations based on the best possible rules. What is interesting is that, in practice, 
such an approach, which is an instrumental use of law, has led to the same approach 
to the world and, in consequence, an instrumental use of people.





INSTRUMENTALISATION OF LAW IN UTOPIAS
There is no doubt that law and state are interrelated. A matter that is still dis- 
puted, however, is the significance and consequences of their mutual impact. On one 
hand, “law is an active instrument of political activities”. On the other hand, “law 
also impacts the state because it strengthens the values vital for community life, 
which influence the state policy”.3 Therefore, like Lech Morawski said, everything 
that is non-instrumental is related with various values, including, most of all, “the 
expression of justice, a social condemnation of morally reprehensible acts”.4 In this 
context, “it may mean that everything that is not instrumental remains the field of 
the axiology of law – the evaluations that have not been instrumentally relativ-
ised”.5 Marek Safjan points to a particularly strong axiological connotation of the 
principles that determine the rules applied in the state of law, where the violation of 
the values behind those rules is (or should be) considered as the violation of those 
rules.6 In his opinion, “at some point, in a country where there is a rule of law, it is 
no longer possible to separate the formal domain from the axiological domain”.7
It was for a reason that Bronisław Baczko (1924–2016), while describing 
a perfect Renaissance utopian, wrote that it is “a political dreamer creating de-
lusive visions of ideal legislation”.8 This “delusiveness” comes from “a longing 
for a society that is logical, cohesive and transparent, but also from the belief that 
social life can be transformed and rationalized”.9 To transform and rationalize life, 
which is difficult, and, in the strict utopian sense, practically impossible, we can 
transform the law in any way we want but that does not mean we can rationalize it.
Hence, if we claim that there is always a certain type of law in every utopia, it is 
most certainly treated as a tool. However, as I have pointed out in the introduction, 
the instrumental approach to law in utopias must be considered necessary but, at 
the same time, dangerous or even damaging. It is not only about the two extreme 
approaches to the instrumental use of law, i.e. legal nihilism and absolutism, but 
also the third type of such use – the relativisation of law. Each of those instrumental 
3 E. Zieliński, Nauka o państwie i polityce, Warszawa 2006, p. 69.
4 L. Morawski, Instrumentalizacja prawa (zarys problemu), „Państwo i Prawo” 1996, no. 6, 
p. 23.
5 S. Kaźmierczyk, Założenia metodologiczne rozważań o relacjach między prawem w znacze-
niu instrumentalnym a prawem w znaczeniu pozainstrumentalnym, [in:] Z zagadnień teorii i filozofii 
prawa. Instrumentalizacja prawa, ed. A. Kozak, Wrocław 2000, p. 18.
6 M. Safjan, Państwo a wartości etyczne. Prawo i polityka, [in:] Prawo a polityka. Materiały 
z konferencji Wydziału Prawa i Administracji Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, która odbyła się 24 lutego 
2006 roku, ed. M. Zubik, Warszawa 2007, p. 25.
7 Ibidem.
8 B. Baczko, Światła utopii, transl. W. Dłuski, Warszawa 2016, p. 47.
9 Idem, Wyobrażenia społeczne. Szkice o nadziei i pamięci zbiorowej, transl. M. Kowalska, 
Warszawa 1994, pp. 155–156.
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ways of using the law makes it more distant from its most important ideal – justice. 
It often happens that in the pursuit of values other than justice, the law, although 
still seems to have its binding power, loses its essence and axiological sense. In 
the end, the law without justice – according to Gustav Radbruch (1878–1949) – is 
no longer the law, especially the kind of law that it should be in the philosophical 
and legal understanding.10
The question asked in the title can also be answered with a “yes” and such an 
answer, assuming the possibility of a social utopia without the law, is also justifiable 
in the academic discourse, just like any other theoretical concept. In practice, how-
ever, one cannot find any point in a utopia without the law, especially if the utopia 
applies to the life of people understood as beings that are intelligent and social at 
the same time, which is the usual utopian approach. Utopianism also has its roots 
in philosophical idealism, which means that they both have the same object and 
method as they base on ideas understood as mental constructs.11 But do utopias 
always make sense or should they? As Charles Rihs said: “utopian philosophers 
did not develop their systems only a priori”. He believed that, quite to the contrary, 
their concepts of man, human nature, justice, reason, political and social equality 
are not closed theoretical constructions but are always related to what is practical 
and based on reality.12 Historical examples show that there is no other way to realize 
utopia or even try to realize it than by means of law. What is more, this way is the 
simplest and most effective method. The communist ideology is the best example 
here. While its doctrine advocated legal nihilism, the end of the state, freedom and 
equality in a classless society, the political practice of the proletarian revolution 
showed a growing disparity between reality and the ideals declared by Marks and 
Engels in their writings and then by the Bolsheviks winning the October Revolu-
tion.13 They believed that communism was not a utopia because it was supposed 
to be realized and yet, since it has not been realized, it remained to be a utopia.14 
Thus, the communist practice of making and applying the law was utopian from 
the start. Law was treated as a tool used mainly in the ideological and political 
fight for power. Historically, it evolved from the declared legal nihilism to a more 
and more visible legal absolutism.15
10 See M. Szyszkowska, Europejska filozofia prawa, Warszawa 1993, pp. 2–3, 83–94.
11 Cf. Ł. Stefaniak, Utopizm. Źródła myślowe i konsekwencje cywilizacyjne, Lublin 2011, p. 11, 140.
12 Cf. Ch. Rihs, Les philosophes utopistes: le mythe de la cite communautaire en France au 
XVIIIe siècle, Paris 1970, p. 241.
13 See A. Bosiacki, Utopia, władza, prawo. Doktryna i koncepcje prawne „bolszewickiej” Rosji 
1917–1921, Warszawa 1999.
14 Cf. K. Kuźmicz, Istota utopii komunizujących, [in:] Oblicza utopii, obłudy i zakłamania, ed. 
W. Łysiak, vol. 1, Poznań 2013, pp. 45–61.
15 Cf. idem, Filozoficzne przesłanki instrumentalizacji prawa w utopii komunistycznej, „Miscel-
lanea Historico-Iuridica” 2015, vol. 14(1), p. 311 ff., 322.





If law is used in an instrumental way, oriented on security or some clearly 
defined goals, especially short-term political ones, it can never be regarded as fair. 
Franciszek Ryszka (1924–1998) warned against such situations when authoritari-
anism or totalitarianism is born in the majesty of law although not in the majesty 
of justice. Taking the example of Nazi Germany, we can repeat after Ryszka that 
as far as lawmaking is concerned, everything “starts from the consolidation of the 
mechanism and from political and legal centralization. At the same time, social 
life is being subordinated to the state. There is no doubt: it is the state, the fascist 
state that dominates all aspects of life and subordinates everything to state con-
trol”.16 Referring to the opinions presented by F. Grimm – a professor of law and 
a declared Nazi, Ryszka emphasized also that the great misfortune of the then 
German judicature was that it had become political because all the evil that came 
from that started when politics was mixed with the administration of justice.17 Such 
a combination usually works in favour of the power holders but it has little to do 
with justice. According to Jerzy Oniszczuk, in Radbruch’s times, the practice of 
fascism questioned the utopian belief that only reasonable legal regulations con-
stitute the law and that it was not possible to make irrational and unfair laws that 
hit man’s freedom.18
On the example of totalitarian – communist and Nazi – ideologies, we can see 
from a historical perspective the effects of such instrumental use of law and what 
it leads to. It is typical not only for non-democratic governments, i.e. totalitarian 
systems, all kinds of dictatorships and tyrannies, but it is also connected with the 
revolutionary approach to law. Different utopias take an active part in practically 
each “revolutionary celebration”19 and leave their marks not only on the newly 
established law but also on the lives of ordinary people, more often making it hell 
rather than heaven. According to Harold Berman, revolution is the change of the 
binding law and it is a change that is systemic in its nature, i.e. major, sudden and 
permanent.20 The old legal system is always replaced by a new one with an as-
sumption that it is also a better (a more appropriate) one for the given times, place 
and people. Even Plato (427–347 B.C.), when asked: “What kind of country do we 
need if we want to introduce our laws easily?”, said: “Give us a country ruled by 
16 F. Ryszka, Państwo stanu wyjątkowego. Rzecz o systemie państwa i prawa Trzeciej Rzeszy, 
Wrocław–Warszawa–Kraków–Gdańsk 1974, p. 343.
17 Cf. ibidem, pp. 352–353.
18 Cf. J. Oniszczuk, Prawo do oporu i Radbrucha wizja nieposłuszeństwa obywateli. Opór jako 
odtworzenie nowoczesnej polis, [in:] Nieprzeciętność. Dylematy wolności, eds. M. Szyszkowska, 
A. Rossmanith, Warszawa 2013, p. 20. See also Dobre prawo, złe prawo – w kręgu myśli Gustawa 
Radbrucha, eds. P. Mochnaczewski, A. Kociołek-Pęksa, Warszawa 2009.
19 B. Baczko, Światła…, p. 266 ff.
20 Cf. H. Berman, Prawo a rewolucja. Kształtowanie się zachodniej tradycji prawnej, transl. 
S. Amsterdamski, Warszawa 1995, p. 33.
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a tyrant! He just needs to be young, clever, brave and generous”!21 It must, then, be 
a person who will always treat the law as a tool for the state policy and he himself 
will be above the law in this country. Quite rightly, utopias, as “prophecies”,22 
should be treated as strictly related to totalitarianisms23 and can be blamed for 
them but, certainly, they do not take the whole blame. It would be inadequate and 
unfair to assume that. We should stop and think: Would the world without utopia 
be a better place? Although we will never know which way the history would have 
gone without it, we can most certainly say that the contemporary world without 
utopia would be civilizationally and culturally poorer.
TYPES OF LAWLESSNESS IN THE CONTEXT 
OF INSTRUMENTALISATION OF LAW
The instrumental use of law often leads to lawlessness, especially if it is ac-
companied by examples of injustice. We can differentiate three main types of 
lawlessness. The first of them is nihilistic lawlessness – the true lawlessness, con-
nected with the etymology of the word. Obviously, lawlessness is the absence of 
law but, in its hardcore version, it is also the lack of any rules, principles or norms 
that have a character of legal regulations. The Polish dictionary defines “lawless-
ness” as “a state not regulated by any laws: anarchy, chaos” and “an illegal act; an 
abuse” while the adjective “lawless” is defined as “contrary to the law, forbidden 
by the law, illegal”.24 Certainly, lawlessness in this sense of the word cannot be 
associated with Plato’s nihilism. His ideal state, which is an archetype of utopia, 
is a state where, despite the lack of laws, there is justice, governance and order. 
While interpreting the views of this philosopher expressed first in the Republic and 
then in the Laws, we can talk about the lack of different laws but not about the lack 
of values. In Platonic idealism, the ultimate value is attributed to ideas, which are 
objective realities: perfect, timeless, unchangeable and hierarchized. At the top, 
we have goodness, beauty, truth and justice – the most important idea both for the 
law and for the state. The latter is defined as a harmony of civil virtues: wisdom, 
courage and moderation. It is an indication of the idea of goodness in the life of 
the state and its citizens.25 According to Plato “no state or individual can be happy 
21 A. Krawczuk, Pan i jego filozof. Rzecz o Platonie, Poznań 1984, p. 180.
22 Cf. K.R. Popper, Społeczeństwo otwarte i jego wrogowie, vol. 2: Wysoka fala proroctw: Hegel, 
Marks i następstwa, transl. H. Krahelska, Warszawa 1993.
23 Cf. B. Baczko, Wyobrażenia społeczne…, pp. 135–157.
24 Słownik języka polskiego, vol. 1: A–K, ed. M. Szymczak, Warszawa 1978, p. 148.
25 M. Szyszkowska, Zarys filozofii prawa, Białystok 1994, p. 70.





if their life is not ruled by reason and justice”.26 Therefore, “the lawgiver ought to 
have three things in view: first, that the city for which he legislates should be free; 
and secondly, be at unity with herself; and thirdly, should have understanding”.27 
Similarly, political activity is “nothing other than carrying out the principles of 
justice in practice”.28 However, in his opinion, wrong are those who think “that it is 
possible to give permanent foundations to a state just by laying down the laws”.29 As 
a result, in view of Plato’s objective idealism, the essence of everything, including 
the laws, is determined by absolute, timeless and unchangeable ideas. Looking at 
Plato’s political and legal concepts, we can see very clearly legal nihilism, especially 
in the context of statutory law, but, at the same time, there is also the absolutism of 
values, which appears to be dominant. Eventually, power exercised by men, even 
the best ones, turns out to be less certain than the power of good laws. The ulti-
mate principle that ensures justice appears to be “subordination to the law, which 
exercises its supreme power not only over citizens but also kings if they commit 
any unlawful acts”.30
The second form of lawlessness is blatant lawlessness, which can also be re-
ferred to as relativist lawlessness. It is a state where the binding law and legal order 
is violated consciously and deliberately, thus – blatantly. According to the definition 
proposed by Ulpian (around 170–228 A.D.) “lawlessness takes its name from the 
situation when something happens against the law; we say that everything that is 
against the law is lawless”.31 On one hand, lawlessness is also connected with the 
lack of respect for the law. Hence, even if the law is binding, it is not respected. 
On the other hand, lawlessness may be identified with self-will. There is always 
somebody who does not like the binding legal regulations, thinks they make no 
sense, are disadvantageous and even useless. It should be emphasized here that, just 
like Rudolf von Ihering (1818–1892) said, there is a constant and ruthless struggle 
between law and lawlessness.32 This battle is fought between those who abide by 
the law and those who violate it. The struggle for law becomes an obligation we 
have towards ourselves and the whole society33 because “everybody is a natural 
defender of law acting in public interest”.34 In this struggle, law is identified with 
26 Platon, Państwo: z dodaniem siedmiu ksiąg Praw, transl. W Witwicki, vol. 1, Warszawa 1958, 
p. 42.




30 Idem, Państwo…, p. 73.
31 Ulpianus, D. 47.10.1, quoted after Łacińska terminologia prawnicza, ed. J. Zajadło, Warszawa 
2009, p. 34.
32 Cf. R. von Ihering, Walka o prawo, transl. B. Kutyłowski, Petersburg 1894, p. 52.
33 Ibidem, p. 26, 50.
34 Ibidem, p. 55.
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justice and lawlessness with its absence. The positivistic sense of this concept is that 
the binding law, always and everywhere, determines, defines and delivers justice. 
Here, the law treated in an instrumental way appears to be a proper tool or even 
the only and the best weapon to fight against any lawlessness. Ihering summed it 
up in the best way by saying that “the highest and the bravest element of art and 
literature is the man’s fight for ideals, the struggle for law and truth”.35 That is the 
struggle that fits perfectly with the beliefs of utopians, the majority of whom were 
men of letters, mostly rationalists and idealists, rather philosophers and jurists than 
practicing lawyers.
The third form of lawlessness is the so-called “statutory lawlessness”, which, 
the above-mentioned Radbruch contrasted with “supra-statutory law”.36 This kind 
of lawlessness means that the binding legal regulations are blatantly unfair and, as 
such, cannot, in fact, be considered as law. This concept applies also to the imper-
fections of positive law as compared to the ideal of justice. Due to the formal nature 
of law – its making and then application – it is, in fact, its form that determines 
what the law is rather than its content. Therefore, we cannot talk about any law if 
its application results in any injustice or damage, or, if such law leads, or what is 
even worse, forces people to do wrong.
WHAT SHOULD LAW BE? LAW IN UTOPIAS
In utopias, we can not only find the answer to this question but also find out 
what it means that the law is perfect, wise and right. This is the law in its axiolog-
ical sense: fair, wise and simple, both in terms of content and form. The creators 
of utopias did not hide the fact that they based their ideas on three ancient sources 
of the European culture: the Bible, Roman law and Greek philosophy. Quite the 
opposite, they emphasized those sources and referred to them in practically all 
law-related contexts.
First of all, in utopias we have clear and quite frequent references to the biblical 
understanding of law contained therein, which is the manifestation of God’s jus-
tice. Only a handful of men on Earth remained faithful to God’s justice: prophets, 
including Noah, Abraham, Moses, the wisest of Israeli kings – Salomon or, the 
capstone of its power – Jesus Christ – the saviour and messiah for Christians, but 
also the future judge of mankind on Judgment Day. It comes as no surprise since 
the vast majority of utopists were Christians and many among them, especially in 
the modern era, were clergymen.
35 Ibidem, p. 85.
36 G. Radbruch, Filozofia prawa, transl. E. Nowak, Warszawa 2009, pp. 244–254.





The law is revealed in the Old Testament, but justice, righteousness, fairness 
and every good path can only be understood by those to whose hearts wisdom have 
entered and to whose souls knowledge is pleasant.37 The Book of Proverbs praises 
the just and the righteous. We can read there that happy is he who keeps the Law 
for he is a wise son; the Lord will not allow the righteous soul to famish; in the 
house of the righteous there is much treasure; righteousness leads to life; the upright 
will dwell in the land; righteousness exalts a nation; the desire of the righteous 
will be granted; the righteousness of the upright will deliver them; the thoughts of 
the righteous are right; the righteous man walks in his integrity; the righteous will 
never be removed; the righteous is delivered from trouble; the righteous than others 
happier; and to the righteous, good shall be repaid.38 It is also worth remembering 
that when the righteous are in authority, the people rejoice,39 and by justice a king 
gives a country stability40.
Later, in the New Testament, Jesus Christ, in his teachings, often mentioned 
his Kingdom and that is what he said about its law:
Love, not severity radiates from God: sunbeams, not flashes of lightning… when the Kingdom 
of God is established, that is the Kingdom of love, the children of God and subjects of the King will 
be given one only commandment which will comprise everything: “Love your God with your whole 
self and your neighbour like yourself”. […] How simple the last Law will be! As God is, Who is 
perfect in His simplicity. Listen: love God with your whole self, love your neighbour like yourself. 
Mediate: are the burdensome six hundred and thirteen precepts and all the prayers and blessings not 
already included in those two sentences, divested of useless cavils, which are not religion but slavery 
towards God? If you love God, you will certainly honour Him every hour of the day. If you love 
your neighbour, you will not do anything that will grieve him. You will not lie, steal, kill or injure, 
you will not commit adultery.41
Lech Dubel emphasized that this love to mankind declared by Jesus Christ is 
not dependent on any human traits such as gender, nationality or profession. Ac-
cording to him, Christ’s formula of love, which goes beyond the Old Testament, is 
not limited to a feeling but foregrounds an active attitude to other people. Thus: “By 
loving God, we love other people”.42 In view of what Thomas More (1478–1535) 
later said in his utopia – the first one, after all – about the law (what it should be), 
37 Book of Proverbs, 2:9–10, www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Proverbs%20
2%3A9-10&version=NIV [access: 29.12.2020].
38 Ibidem.
39 Book of Proverbs, 29:2, www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Proverbs%20
2%3A9-10&version=NIV [access: 29.12.2020].
40 Book of Proverbs, 29:4, www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Proverbs%2029%3A4&ver-
sion=NIV [access: 29.12.2020].
41 M. Valtorta, The Poem of the Man-God, https://archive.org/details/Volume1OfThePoemOfT-
heManGod [access: 29.12.2020].
42 L. Dubel, J. Malarczyk, Historia doktryn polityczno-prawnych, Lublin 2001, p. 65.
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we can conclude that: firstly, life without law is not possible, especially in a com-
munity. Secondly, life, especially social life, should be organized based on law. 
And thirdly, the power of law comes from justice, which is strictly related to its 
wisdom and simplicity. The inhabitants of Utopia
have but few laws, and such is their constitution that they need not many. They very much 
condemn other nations whose laws, together with the commentaries on them, swell up to so many 
volumes; for they think it an unreasonable thing to oblige men to obey a body of laws that are both 
of such a bulk, and so dark as not to be read and understood by every one of the subjects. […] They 
argue thus: all laws are promulgated for this end, that every man may know his duty.43
For most utopists, the second important source of law is Roman law. Latin legal 
maxims appeared to be particularly useful here. Although they were not quoted 
directly, the message they carry shows how seriously law was treated in utopias. 
First of all, I am referring here to the principles of Roman public law (ius publicum) 
connected with power, lawmaking or law enforcement and, secondly, the principles 
related to different institutions which take their origins in the Roman private law 
(ius privatum).44 If Romans believed that even robbers have their own laws (etiam 
latrones suis legibus parent), then, obviously, so do all those who want (willingly 
and consciously) to abide by the law. The point made in this quotation, which is 
attributed to Cicero, is developed in another of his “golden thoughts” addressed to 
all those who want to live in accordance with the law, i.e. “we are slaves of the law 
in order to be free” (leges non esse servor oportet, ut liberii simus).45 Indeed, life 
without law is impossible and hard to imagine but do we have to regulate literally 
everything with law? It is against common sense and, even more so, against wisdom, 
and usually leads to legally sanctioned absurdities. The making or application of law 
in itself cannot become the sense of life or, even less so, the rationale for power. By 
interfering into people’s private lives or, what is more, trying to control them and 
regulate by means of statutes, personal freedoms of the individual are gradually 
limited and finally taken away – and it happens in accordance with the law. When 
the law becomes a value in itself, it stops being the carrier and manifestation of 
other values, which it should implement and guarantee.
Most Latin maxims indicate that law is a value in itself, which borders on ab-
solutism. Such an approach to law is confirmed by such commonly known today 
principles as: dura lex sed lex, in dubio pro reo, lex retro non agit, nulla poena sine 
43 T. More, Utopia, www.fulltextarchive.com/pdfs/Utopia.pdf [access: 29.12.2020].
44 Ulpianus: Publicum ius est quod ad statum rei publicae Romanae spectat, ius privatum est 
quod ad singulorum utilitatem spectat (quoted after Wstęp do nauk prawnych, ed. A. Jamróz, Białystok 
1998, p. 84).
45 Latin maxims, https://best-quotations.com [access: 29.12.2020].





lege, pacta sunt servanda.46 Besides, the law does not concern itself with trifles (de 
minimis non curat lex) and the law does not arise from injustice (ex iniuria non 
oritur ius).47 There are too many laws that do not introduce order but contribute to 
chaos, making our life even more difficult and complicated than it really is instead 
of making it easier and simpler. Even Tacit (approx. 55–120 A.D.), an ancient 
Roman historian, warned that: “the more numerous the laws, the more corrupt the 
government” (corruptissima res publica plurimae leges).48 In utopias, it is postu-
lated, just like the Romans wanted, that laws should be concise (legem brevem esse 
oportet) and easy to understand for everybody (leges ab omnibus intellegi debent).49
What is more, the Romans, just like Plato, came to the same conclusion re-
garding the relationship between law and power holders. According to them, the 
authority of the rule of law is always more powerful and mighty than the authority 
of men (imperia legum potentiora quam hominum),50 and those who hold power 
cannot stand above the law. They claimed that it is much better if there is any law, 
even if it has its shortcomings, than when there is no law at all (melior aliqua 
quam nulla lex).51 Although realistic and pragmatic, the Romans idealized the law 
and emphasized its great importance for the society. They believed that laws are 
the foundations of an efficiently functioning state (in legibus fundamentum rei 
publicae) and understood that stern masters do not reign long (iniqua numquam 
regna perpetuo manent).52 Therefore, in order to exist all peoples must be ruled 
by laws and customs (omnes populi legibus aut moribus regentur),53 and the state 
is nothing else but an association of citizens based on law (quid est enim nisi iuris 
societas civium).54
On the other hand, the Romans understood that to know the laws is not to 
observe their mere words, but their force and power (scire leges non hoc est verba 
earum tenere, sed vi mac potestatem).55 Being aware of the threats related to the 
complexity of law and strict adherence thereto, they even considered the latter to be 
supreme injustice (summum ius summa iniuria).56 What is more, they came to the 
46 “Tough law but still a law” (D. 40.9.12.1); “When in doubt, [for] the accused” (D. 50.17.125); 
“The law is not retroactive” (ad C. 1.14.7); “Agreements must be kept” (ad D. 2.14.7.7). Quoted after 
W. Wołodkiewicz, Czy prawo rzymskie przestało istnieć?, Kraków 2003, pp. 176–178.
47 Latin maxims…
48 Tacitus, Ab excessu divi Augusti, Annales III, 27, quoted after Sentencje łacińskie, comp. 
M. Dubiński, Warszawa 2005, p. 335.





54 Cicero, De re publica 1.49, quoted after W. Wołodkiewicz, op. cit., p. 177.
55 D. 1.2.17, quoted after W. Wołodkiewicz, op. cit., p. 173.
56 Cicero, De officiis 1.33, quoted after W. Wołodkiewicz, op. cit., p. 176.
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conclusion that the law should be comprehensible to all (leges ab omnibus intellegi 
debent)57 because where the right is uncertain there is no right (ubi ius incertum, ibi 
ius nullum).58 The law presented in utopias is usually based on Roman principles 
and the meaning they carry: wisdom, universality and, most of all, respect for law 
in general and for the values that the law represents and safeguards. In utopias, not 
only freedom is protected by law (libertas in legibus)59 but also all other values 
because without law they would be utopian and in utopia, they are not. Thanks 
to those values, the law becomes more meaningful and thanks to the law, values 
can be put into practice. To sum up the above deliberations, it may be said that the 
Latin maxim which best fits both the world of utopia and the real one is: wherever 
there is society, there is, or at least, there should be law (ubi societas, ibi ius).60
Also the legacy of Greek philosophy is clearly visible in utopia, just like that 
of the Bible and the Roman law. What was particularly useful for utopists were the 
Greek philosophical concepts concerning the state and the law. The first of them is 
connected with a branch of philosophy known as political philosophy, whose purpose 
is to find the best polity for the state, including legal solutions and reflections on the 
possibilities of holding the power. The second is connected with the perennial reflec-
tion on the essence of law, its functioning and axiology.61 In Greek mythology, the 
three daughters of Zeus and Themis were goddesses: Eirene – the goddess of peace, 
Dike – the goddess of socially enforced justice, and Eunomos, who was identified 
with the rule of law. The Greeks understood that they had to make sure the law is 
good. The Romans believed that the law is their king (lex est rex) and in the modern 
era, all of that has been confirmed and developed into the doctrine of the state based 
on justice and integrity, or, in other words – the rule of law (Rechtsstaat). At present, 
the idea of “implementing the principles of social justice” is practiced by the Republic 
of Poland, which, in accordance with the binding constitution, is “a democratic state 
ruled by law”,62 which, “to put it simply, can be defined as the obligation of public 
authorities to act with respect for the rule of law”.63
In this context, a great example of modern political philosophy and the philos-
ophy of law is a pro-republican concept presented by Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), 
who described the proper relations between politics and law by saying that “all 
politics must bend the knee to the principle of right, and may, in that way, hope 




61 Cf. G. Radbruch, Filozofia…, pp. 13–21.
62 Article 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 1997 (Journal of Laws 1997, 
no. 78, item 483 as amended). English translation of the Constitution at www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/
konst/angielski/kon1.htm [access: 10.02.2021].
63 M. Derlatka, Wprowadzenie, [in:] Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, Warszawa 2012, p. 9.





to reach, although slowly perhaps, a level whence it may shine upon men for all 
time”.64 Therefore, “politics which is in accordance with law is just and useful; the 
opposite makes it false and ugly”.65 However, woe to him who does politics and 
does not hold the binding law as sacred.66 At the same time, it is still a fact, and an 
issue of concern that “politics undergoes juridification, i.e. it is more and more often 
subjected to legal rules and values” but also the fact that there are no “social norms, 
other than formally imposed legal regulations, that would structure political life”.67
Thomas More, the author of the first modern utopia and an educated jurist, an 
advisor and a chancellor of Henry VIII, King of England, was certainly inspired 
by the Bible, the Roman law and philosophical and legal reflections regarding the 
values that are important for the law.68 The next utopists followed in his footsteps 
and usually chose the easiest way, i.e. discarded a certain type of law, its branch 
or certain legal institutions claiming them to be unnecessary. Hence, in utopias we 
may not find certain branches of law that we are familiar with such as, for instance, 
constitutional law – when there is no constitution (in its formal sense) or we do not 
have a number of legal acts (constitution in its material sense) of major significance; 
marital and family law – when there are no marriages or families; criminal law – 
when there is no crime; tax law – when taxes are not collected, etc. In this way, we 
can create a conceptual model of a society which has no legal regulations or instru-
ments for the given aspect of life. On the other hand, however, utopias can come up 
with new regulations that are deemed necessary and cater for the needs related to 
different life situations. Very often, in utopias we have new legal solutions, which 
forerun new branches of law such as the branches of contemporary law: labour 
law, ecclesiastical law, penitentiary law. The absence of certain branches of law 
in a utopia is usually manifested by the absence of a code that would regulate it. 
This is why, first of all, a utopia may not have the kind of law that is fundamental 
in our world, i.e. statutory, man-made law (positive law) in the form of different 
normative acts such as constitutions, acts, edicts, decrees, ordinances, regulations, 
orders, etc., which are not adopted in a utopia. The existence of the law of nature 
64 I. Kant, Perpetual Peace, a philosophical essay, https://archive.org/stream/perpetualpeaceph-
00kantuoft [access: 29.12.2020].
65 Idem, Wznowione pytanie czy rodzaj ludzki stale zmierza ku temu, co lepsze?, transl. M. Że-
lazny, [in:] idem, Spór fakultetów, Toruń 2003, p. 188. See also B. Szlachta, O pewnym temacie 
podejmowanym przez amerykańskich filozofów polityki, [in:] Amerykomania. Księga jubileuszowa 
ofiarowana Andrzejowi Mani, ed. W. Bernacki, vol. 2, Kraków 2012, pp. 847–848.
66 Cf. M. Szyszkowska, Filozoficzne interpretacje prawa, Warszawa 1999, p. 118.
67 Cf. W. Staśkiewicz, Prawo jako narzędzie polityki państwa okresu przemian (przeszłość wobec 
przyszłości), [in:] Prawo a polityka…, p. 75.
68 Thomas More was beatified in 1886 by Pope Leo XIII and canonised in 1935 by Pope Pius XI. 
Pope John II declared More the patron saint of politicians and statesmen in Motu proprio encyclical 
of 31 October 2000. See D. Agasso, Święci na każdy dzień. Czerwiec, transl. K. Stopa, Kielce 2009, 
pp. 93–94.
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(natural law) is less often questioned by utopists, who are much more willing to rely 
upon it and treat it as a law which is universal, linked to human nature or has divine 
origins. But what we most often see in utopias are the local people, who respect 
the rules of customary law, based on the wisdom and justice of their ancestors and 
traditions. Hence, law, in this form or another, is usually present in social utopias 
although its role is not always emphasized. Even though, in theory, a utopia with-
out a specific kind of law is possible, in practice, when there is no statutory law 
in a utopia, there are some norms derived from customary law, natural law, divine 
law, etc. In general, utopias acknowledge the co-existence of different kinds of law 
that come from such sources as God, Nature, customs, legislation or precedents.
Probably the most reasonable, so far, explanation of what law should not be 
was provided by Wilhelm Weitling (1808–1871), in his Guarantees of Harmony 
and Freedom. We can read in his utopia:
There will be no crimes! Hence, there will be no punishments, judges, police, prisons, prison 
guards; there will be no patrolmen, court clerks, barristers; there will be no complaints, no prosecu-
tors and no accused; there will be no criminal codes or court files, no executioner’s axes, gallows or 
sticks; there will be no terror or fear; there will be no pretend virtues or vice; there will be no more 
murderers, bandits, thieves, slanderers or frauds! […] The same goes for producing all unnecessary 
papers such as: purchase or rental agreements, apprenticeship contracts, prenuptial agreements, leases, 
work contracts and other: rent and debt papers, last wills, calls for payment, court reports, mortgages, 
passports, circulars, tax lists; the whole caboodle will be all unnecessary.69
It is hard to imagine our life without all that but all we need is “to live honestly, 
to harm no one, and to give to each one his due”70 – that is a really important, if not 
the most important, thing about the law – because this is what justice is.71
There is no doubt that what counts in the utopian approach to law is not the 
quantity – the number of regulations – but the quality of law, i.e. its basic content, 
which determines justice thanks to its wisdom and simplicity. It is clear that wis-
dom and justice are not only timeless values for the law itself but also universal 
values for people as intelligent and, at the same time, social creatures. Therefore, 
philosophical and legal reflections regarding, most of all, “legal axiology, which 
is the system of values underlying the whole legal system”72 is an indispensable 
element of utopian thinking and the utopian world.
69 W. Weitling, Gwarancje harmonii i wolności, transl. E. Werfel, Warszawa 1968, p. 316, 318.
70 Ulpianus, D. 1.1.10: Iuris praecepta sunt haec: honeste vivere, alterum non ledere, suum 
cuique tribuere (quoted after Łacińska terminologia…, pp. 35–36).
71 See M. Jońca, Praecepta iuris, czyli o tym, co jest w prawie naprawdę ważne, „Edukacja 
Prawnicza” 2011, no. 3(123); P. Kołodko, Sprawiedliwość jako naczelna idea prawa, [in:] Filozofia 
prawa w życiu i nauczaniu, ed. M. Szyszkowska, Białystok 2004, pp. 134–142.
72 A. Sylwestrzak, Historia doktryn politycznych i prawnych, Warszawa 2011, p. 18.






Each law should be analysed with reference to Radbruch’s concept of law triad: 
legal certainty, expediency and justice.73 As underlined by Maria Szyszkowska, jus-
tice determines the form of law, to ensure legal certainty the law must be statutory 
while “expediency entails the determination of the contents of law”.74 Nevertheless, 
it is justice that is of the utmost value for the law itself, both in its axiological and 
ontic sense. Radbruch himself, in the fourth minute of his Five Minutes of Legal 
Philosophy, wrote:
Of course, it is true that the public benefit, along with justice, is an objective of the law. And of 
course, laws have value in and of themselves, even bad laws: the value, namely, of securing the law 
against uncertainty. And of course, it is true that, owing to human imperfection, the three values of 
the law – public benefit, legal certainty, and justice – are not always united harmoniously in laws.75
Just like in Corinthians 13 – The Hymn to Love, among the three listed divine 
virtues: faith, hope and love, love is the greatest one, if there was a hymn to justice, 
among the three values of law: certainty, expediency and justice – justice would 
be the most important one.76
73 See G. Radbruch, Filozofia…, pp. 79–84.
74 M. Szyszkowska, Teoria i filozofia prawa, Warszawa 2008, p. 188.
75 G. Radbruch, Five Minutes of Philosophy, http://wystap.pl/wp-content/files/Radbruch_Ex-
treme_Injustice.pdf [access: 29.12.2020].
76 A potential Hymn to Justice could go like that: “If there were no hungry or thirsty, / Poor 
or humiliated, / But there was no justice, it would be nothing. / If all men were made happy, / They 
enjoyed unrestrained freedom, but had no justice, / They would have nothing, / Because deep down 
they would still feel enslaved. / If law made them equal, / They would demand privileges and aim at 
inequality. / If the law declared that people were brothers and sisters, / They would swear they were 
strangers to one another. / Even if there was to be eternal peace, governance and order, / But for the 
price of justice, / It would be worse than war. / It would just be a cover-up for unimaginable chaos. / 
Because justice is like love, / It is an eternal blessing: / Divine for believers, the majesty of the state 
for those who crave for it. / Justice is the foundation for law-abiding rulers, / Who know that absolute 
adherence to regulations can turn into great lawlessness. / Justice is also patient. / It is not guided by 
personal likes and dislikes, / Which can turn it around. / It never looks for revenge because it knows 
no anger. / Justice is the art of doing what is good and right, / Always based on wisdom. / Justice 
needs courage and moderation. / It is an eternal, unchangeable and perfect principle of all laws. / It 
is about giving everybody what is due to them. / It contemns all vice and crime. / It cares only about 
the truth, recks little of father’s or mother’s tears. / It is a sister of peace and the rule of law. / Justice 
always wins in the end, / Even if it is only in the conscience of that who pleads guilty. / It believes 
in good will, / Vests its hopes in people’s hearts, / Loves penitence and repentance, / Especially for 
wrong thoughts, words and acts. / Without it, we will vanish into thin air. / It’s only thanks to justice 
that we can survive. / Trying to achieve it – we really become better. / So now certainty, expediency 
and justice abide. / These three values of the law that bring justice the most”.
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Utopias assume that law secures and guarantees justice and, in consequence, 
the happiness of the people who live in them. The famous Radbruch Formula: Lex 
iniustissima non est lex77 should then be considered to be the most important of 
principles of all laws and, most of all, the positive law, which should be binding 
in the real world just like the laws that are binding in utopias. “The law (legal 
act) unjust in its content loses its legal features [and] […] the law which does not 
attempt to do justice will be rejected as untrue (lawless)”.78 Hence, justice is there 
or not there and there is no such thing as “totalitarian justice”,79 which always 
remains to be injustice. Although we should not always identify the binding law 
with justice, whether or not a given law is a true law will always be determined 
on the basis of justice.
The law in utopias is necessary. First of all, it is vital for their very existence 
as the worlds which are not really there. Secondly, the law in utopias is necessary 
to transform the real world as it is the best and the most efficient tool, plan and 
method that can be used for this purpose. A utopia without the law is usually a kind 
of a negative utopia or rather an anti-utopia or dystopia. There is no doubt that the 
latter is associated with lawlessness, especially statutory lawlessness, which brings 
to mind the injustice of each totalitarian system. On the other hand, the purpose of 
classical utopias, i.e. positive utopias, is to create a community that is absolutely 
perfect on all levels: social, political, economic, moral, etc., and that cannot exist 
without equally perfect, i.e. based on the idea of justice, law, which creates, organ-
izes and protects such a community.
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ABSTRAKT
Charakter naukowo-dydaktyczny artykułu wiąże się z próbą odpowiedzi na postawione w tytule 
pytanie o to, czy możliwa jest utopia bez prawa. Argumenty teoretyczne podane przez autora prowadzą 
do udzielenia odpowiedzi twierdzącej, a zarazem tezy, iż nie ma w gruncie rzeczy utopii bez prawa. 
Prawo nie tylko jest obecne w utopiach, zarówno pozytywnych, jak i negatywnych (antyutopiach 
i dystopiach), lecz także w znaczącym stopniu decyduje o ich istnieniu i funkcjonowaniu. W rezul-
tacie wiąże to myślenie utopijne z rzeczywistością. Każda odpowiedź na powyższe pytanie jest więc 
możliwa i w dyskursie naukowym zasadna. Jednakże autor uzasadnia, że w przypadku zdecydowanej 
większości utopii społecznych jakieś prawo zazwyczaj obowiązuje, a nawet musi w nich być. Istotą 
prawa w utopiach jest bowiem sprawiedliwość, a tej nie ma bez mądrości. Taki właśnie stosunek do 
prawa przejawia się w Biblii. Takie przesłanie niosą również zasady prawa rzymskiego oraz wynika 
ono z filozoficzno-prawnej refleksji. Przywołując poglądy m.in. Platona, Immanuela Kanta, Rudolfa 
von Iheringa, Gustava Radbrucha, Karla R. Poppera i Bronisława Baczko, autor wskazuje na prawo 





jako ważny element świata utopii, który je współtworzy, podobnie jak ma wpływ na rzeczywistość. 
Nie ma zatem utopii bez prawa jako idei sprawiedliwości wcielanej w życie społeczne ludzi będących 
istotami rozumnymi.
Słowa kluczowe: utopia; prawo; myślenie utopijne; rzeczywistość; dyskurs naukowy; prawo 
rzymskie; sprawiedliwość
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